Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health  Care by Pasquale, Frank A.
CITE AS 92 N.C.L. REV. 1661 (2014) 
 
 
PRIVATE CERTIFIERS AND DEPUTIES IN 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE* 
FRANK A. PASQUALE** 
So-called “public programs” in U.S. health care pervasively 
contract with private entities. The contracting does not merely 
involve the purchase of drugs, devices, information technology, 
insurance, and medical care. Rather, government agencies are 
increasingly outsourcing decisions about the nature and 
standards for such goods and services to private entities. This 
Article will examine two models of outsourcing such decisions. 
In private licensure, firms offer a stamp of approval to certify 
that a given technology or service is up to statutory or regulatory 
standards. Via deputization, firms can pursue a regulatory or law 
enforcement role to correct (and even punish) providers who 
have failed to meet standards or acted fraudulently. Both private 
licensure and deputization provide new models for 
administrative governance in rapidly changing, technically 
complex fields. But they can also be abused if private licensors or 
deputies are not adequately supervised, or if they are faced with 
too crude an incentive framework. This Article suggests some 
best practices for the outsourcing of responsibility to these health 
care decision makers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
So-called “public programs” in U.S. health care pervasively 
contract with private entities. The contracting does not merely 
involve the purchase of drugs, devices, information technology, 
insurance, and medical care. Rather, government agencies are 
increasingly outsourcing decisions about the nature and standards for 
such goods and services to private entities. This Article will examine 
two models of outsourcing such decisions. In private certification, 
firms offer a stamp of approval to certify that a given technology or 
service is up to statutory or regulatory standards. Via deputization, 
firms can pursue a regulatory or law enforcement role to correct (and 
even punish) providers who have failed to meet standards or acted 
fraudulently. Both private certification and deputization provide new 
models for administrative governance in rapidly changing, technically 
complex fields. But they can also be abused if private licensors or 
deputies are not adequately supervised or if they are faced with too 
crude an incentive framework. This Article reviews critiques of the 
outsourcing of responsibility to these health care decision makers and 
concludes with a suggestion of converging technological 
developments and legal demands. 
The degree of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(“CMS”) oversight of contractors burst into the headlines in October 
of 2013, when failures of the HealthCare.gov website highlighted 
conflictual relationships among CMS and the contractors responsible 
for developing and implementing the federal health insurance 
exchange.1 While much of the critical media coverage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) rollout has been 
 
 1. David Auerbach, The Uninsured Are Now Unpaid Alpha Testers for the 
Government, SLATE (Oct. 30, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology 
/bitwise/2013/10/healthcare_gov_tech_surge_the_uninsured_are_now_unpaid_alpha_tester
s_for.html. 
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unfair,2 even the most steadfast defenders of the Obama 
administration were deeply disappointed by the rollout of 
HealthCare.gov. Former programmer David Auerbach has diagnosed 
some serious issues in government-contractor interrelationships that 
fed into the fiasco and the ongoing problems with fixing it.3 For 
Auerbach, one of the critical faults here was that, “not only was very 
little testing done, but testing frameworks . . . weren’t set up.”4 This 
was a fault not only of contractors, but of basic oversight over their 
implementation of critical information technology infrastructure.5 
Ironically, the U.S. government already has fostered the 
development of a rigorous set of standards for the testing of 
information technology vendors’ software—before the providers that 
buy it can obtain “meaningful use” subsidies for health information 
technology (“HIT”).6 Admittedly, on one level, this is an apples and 
oranges comparison: software for providing actual care is different 
than software that guides people through a maze of agencies, insurers, 
and data brokers.7 On the other hand, the testing and certification of 
 
 2. See Tommy Christopher, CNN’s Jake Tapper and Elizabeth Cohen Try to Be Fair 
About Obamacare ‘Sticker Shock,’ MEDIAITE (Oct. 30, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www 
.mediaite.com/tv/cnns-jake-tapper-and-elizabeth-cohen-try-to-be-fair-about-obamacare-
sticker-shock/. 
 3. Auerbach, supra note 1 (“[As of October 30, 2013,] only 30 percent [of users] have 
been able to complete an actual insurance application. And that’s not even to say that the 
application is correct, owing to reports of children getting listed as multiple spouses and 
the like. . . . [W]hy on earth is the website still up? So people can play insurance-
application roulette with 7–3 odds against them? Why not take the site down until it 
works?”). 
 4. Id. (“That means the team fixing healthcare.gov not only has a lot of bugs to fix, 
but they don’t have infrastructure in place to identify and . . . reproduce the bugs, which 
are the first step to fixing them. Under a tight deadline, any such infrastructure will be ad 
hoc and inadequate.”). 
 5. See Alex Howard, What Went Wrong at Healthcare.gov?, DIGIPHILE (Dec. 1, 
2013), http://digiphile.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/what-went-wrong-at-healthcare-gov/ 
(“[A] combination of procurement problems, poor work by a key contractor, bad 
management skills, insularity and political sensitivity led to a bug-laden website with a 
broken backend.”). 
 6. See generally What is ONC-Authorized Testing and Certification Body (ONC-
ATCB)?, HEALTH IT, http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/faqs/what-onc-
authorized-testing-and-certification-body-onc-atcb (last visited May 7, 2014) (describing 
Authorized Testing and Certification Bodies as set out by the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, which “test and certify that certain types 
of electronic health record (EHR) technology (Complete EHRs and EHR Modules) are 
compliant with the standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria 
adopted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary and 
meet the definition of ‘certified EHR technology’ ”). 
 7. Compare Becca Morn, A Disheartening Visit to Healthcare.gov, AMERICABLOG 
(Oct. 23, 2013, 7:00AM), http://americablog.com/2013/10/disheartening-visit-healthcare-
gov.html (discussing user experience with the HealthCare.gov website), with Philip 
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HIT involves a multistep process of delegation that may well have 
been appropriate in the context of the federal exchange’s 
development. The larger, common issue is that a federal government 
that has become so reliant on contractors may be losing its ability to 
assess the functionality and value of contractors’ handiwork.8 
The stakes of increased digitization and automation in health 
care are high.9 A false record can be used deliberately to “bill . . . for a 
service not rendered” or provide the basis for “upcoding.”10 
Moreover, it can be multiplied easily, given functionalities like one-
click notes, copy and paste features, and billing-decision message 
prompts.11 Both to encourage accurate records and to diminish 
 
Longman, Code Red: How Software Companies Could Screw Up Obama’s Health Care 
Reform, WASH. MONTHLY (July/Aug. 2009), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com 
/features/2009/0907.longman.html (discussing challenges to implementing electronic health 
care management software), and Steve Lohr, Seeing Promise and Peril in Digital Records, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU3 (same), and Bad Health Informatics Can Kill, EFMI 
WG ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH INFO. SYS. (Oct. 19, 2012), http://iig.umit.at/efmi 
/badinformatics.htm (documenting issues with HIT systems that had real-world effects). 
 8. See JODY FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOW, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–3 (2009); see also Richard J. Pierce Jr., 
Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1216, 1216–18 (2008) 
(reviewing PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF 
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT 
IT (2007)).  
 9. See Reed Abelson et al., Medicare Bills Rise as Records Turn Electronic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2012, at A1. Moreover, “[w]ithout a deliberate effort to build fraud 
management into [electronic systems], healthcare payers and consumers will be exposed to 
new and potentially increased vulnerability to electronically-enabled healthcare fraud.” 
FOUND. OF RESEARCH AND EDUC. OF AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N (“AHIMA”), 
REPORT ON THE USE OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE AND 
EXPAND HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD ACTIVITIES 13 (2005), available at http://library 
.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_031699.pdf. 
 10. “Billing for services not rendered” is a scheme wherein a bill is deliberately 
submitted for payment even though no medical service was actually provided. FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES REPORT TO THE PUBLIC: 2010-2011, 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-
2011. “Upcoding,” by contrast, is a scheme wherein the health care provider submits a bill 
using a procedure code that yields a higher payment than the code for the service that was 
truly rendered. Id. It is important to distinguish these two schemes, which are committed 
deliberately, with inadvertent errors in coding for which, according to the Wall Street 
Journal, “[t]here are no comprehensive statistics . . . .” See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, How 
to Fight a Bogus Bill, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2011, at B7, available at http://online.wsj.com 
/news/articles/SB10001424052748703312904576146371931841968 (discussing those who 
deliberately abuse Electronic Health Record software tools to commit health care fraud 
faster and with greater ease). 
 11. Although one-click notes and copy and paste features function differently, they 
largely present the same problem in that they both increase the speed and ease of inserting 
false information into a medical record. One-click notes, as the name suggests, allow 
physicians to paste a pre-programmed examination note with just one-click. See, e.g., 
Daniel Essin, The Ethical Dilemma Created by EHRs, PHYSICIANS PRAC. (June 18, 2012), 
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opportunities for fraud, health care policymakers must continue to 
improve strategies of delegation. 
Analysis proceeds in two parts. Part I reviews extant measures to 
delegate review over the certification of HIT and the challenges this 
effort has faced. Part II analyzes the rocky journey of private fraud 
detection contractors as they do more to analyze the massive set of 
claims generated by Medicare and Medicaid providers. Finally, this 
Article concludes with a prediction: increasing pressures on 
contractors to fight waste, fraud, and abuse will in turn shape 
information technology certification systems. In other words, there 
will be centripetal demands for integration of clinical decision 
support, revenue cycle management, and fraud detection in IT 
systems. While this transition may take a decade or more, it is a 
logical outgrowth of convergent socio-technical and socio-legal trends 
in health care. 
I.  AUTHORIZED TESTING AND CERTIFICATION BODIES (ATCBS) 
FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
A. The Concept of (and Rationale for) Certification 
We are all familiar with the basics of licensing and certification. 
Before you drive, hunt, or fish in most places, you need a license. The 
idea of licensing (if not the name “license”) also appears in diverse 
other regulatory contexts. For instance, particularly before the Dodd-
Frank Act,12 and even today to some extent, many people consider an 
AAA-rating on a security as a needed license for those who may 
purchase it.13 New drugs need Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) approval before they can be sold. 
 
http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/content/article/1462168/2083374; Donald Simborg, 
Promoting Electronic Health Record Adoption: Is It the Correct Focus?, 15 J. AM. MED. 
INFORMATICS ASS’N 127, 128 (2008). Many message prompts go too far and actively 
increase the ease of committing health care fraud by specifically advising physicians what 
documentation is required to justify higher billing codes. Farzad Mostashari, a former 
National Coordinator for ONC, has recognized that prompts that suggest more 
documentation to reach a higher billing code “might be over the line.” See Robert Lowes, 
Federal EHR Office to Look at Overbilling Allegations, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 19, 2012), http:// 
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/772944.  
 12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 931, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012)). 
 13. For an in-depth discussion of the significance of credit rating agencies, see 
generally TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND 
RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS (2005). For creative 
proposals to formalize licensing of financial services, see Saule T. Omarova, License to 
Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 113–
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There is a great deal of interest in expanding the licensing 
concept (or rationale) to new areas of social life. For example, Joseph 
Lorenzo Hall has articulated a proposal for a “license plate for 
drones,” requiring a certain basic form of permission and 
accountability for objects flying in the airspace below 400 feet.14 Saule 
T. Omarova has suggested that certain exotic financial products 
should get pre-approval before they can be sold—she and other 
finance scholars have called for an “FDA of Financial Markets.”15 
1.  Purposes of Regulation 
Licensing fulfills many purposes. At its most basic, it allows 
central authorities a chance to know “what’s out there,” and to 
classify it. I have called this form of classification “Linnaean 
Regulation,” after the work of the famous taxonomist who gave 
genus and species names to flora and fauna.16 While the spirit of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act17 may be to reduce unnecessary 
governmental reporting requirements, such policy commitments can 
and should be trumped in areas where new technology creates new 
risks and dangers. Linnaean regulation can do a great deal to 
rationalize regulatory agendas and priorities, too. For instance, if the 
Federal Aviation Administration receives five million applications for 
licenses for drones, they should loom as a much larger priority for the 
agency to investigate and consider than if, say, it receives five 
hundred. Similarly, the job of the Office of Financial Research will be 
 
40 (2012) (proposing a broader set of regulatory interventions, including something along 
the lines of the FDA/licensing model); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for 
Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century 
Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1316–17 (2013) (discussing the pre-recession 
trend to label even subprime securities as AAA in order to bolster their marketability). 
 14. License Plates & Drone Information Requirements, DRONES & AERIAL 
ROBOTICS CONF., https://droneconference.org/darc_session/license-plates-drone-inform 
ation-requirements/ (last visited May 7, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(discussing a session chaired by Joseph Lorenzo Hall). 
 15. Omarova, supra note 13, at 113–40; Posner & Weyl, supra note 13, at 1348–57. But 
see Todd Zywicki, CFPB “Plain Vanilla” Through the Back Door, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Sept. 12, 2013, 11:42 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/12/cfpb-plain-vanilla-back-
door/ (discussing the “plain vanilla” proposal that Congress rejected as a part of Dodd-
Frank’s establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). 
 16. Frank Pasquale, Linnaean Regulation in Health Insurance and Information 
Technology, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.concurringopinions.com 
/archives/2011/01/linnaean-regulation-in-health-insurance-and-information-
technology.html (last visited May 7, 2014). 
 17. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified 
as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520 (2006)). 
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much easier once Legal Entity Identifiers (“LEI”) are established.18 
The LEIs will be a crucial tool for tracking down exactly what 
financial securities are on the market, who owns them, and who is 
subject to obligations based on them. Finally, the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”) will play a crucial role in helping 
tax authorities keep track of taxable income.19 Each of these 
initiatives is an important step in creating a basic foundation of 
knowledge and analytics for law enforcement. 
Complex and interlocking technological systems also create 
needs for basic tracking of what components are entering into these 
systems. On the most basic level, consider the development of 
railroads: if Chicago firms are building tracks of one gauge, and 
Milwaukee firms are building those of another, there will be trouble 
when they try to meet. In the realm of HIT, interoperability is also a 
pressing concern.20 If one specialty decides on using a kind of HIT 
that cannot “talk”—i.e., communicate information accurately—to 
others, it could lead to serious efficiency losses in the future. 
2.  Quality Regulation 
Does a product actually do what it is billed as doing? That is a 
primary concern of quality regulators. While a market economy often 
turns first to word of mouth or private quality raters and rankers,21 
and then to implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
 
 18. See 45 C.F.R. § 170.302(o) (2012) (requiring each EHR system to “[a]ssign a 
unique name and/or number for identifying and tracking user identity”). This requirement 
is reminiscent of the Office for Financial Research’s (“OFR”) Legal Entity Identifier 
(“LEI”) rulemaking. See Statement on Legal Entity Identification for Financial Contracts, 
75 Fed. Reg. 74,146, 74,147 (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2010-11-30/pdf/2010-30018.pdf. 
 19. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”) was enacted in 2010 as 
part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act. See Hiring Incentives to 
Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501, 124 Stat. 71, 97–106 (2010) (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474 (2012)). 
 20. See generally JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND 
PERILS OF HIGHLY INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 193–210 (2012) (describing the 
American HIT system and opportunities for reform). 
 21. See, e.g., Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 
31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 215, 227–30 (2009) (criticizing the various types of rankings for 
health care providers); Ann Marie Marciarille, “How’s My Doctoring?” Patient Feedback’s 
Role in Assessing Physician Quality, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 361, 362 (2012) 
(describing the power of user-generated medical reviews on “Angie’s List, Yelp, and 
specialty sites like RateMDs.com”); id. at 385–88 (reporting on the non-public databases 
of physician quality markers, including the National Practitioners Data Bank and the 
CMS’s Physician Compare program). 
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particular purpose as a second line of defense, sometimes a product 
or service needs governmental approval or inspection.22 
3.  Safety Regulation 
On a more ambitious level, we also turn to licensing if there are 
certain dangers that can be prevented predictably by an initial 
approval process and neither tort nor contract liability can reliably 
deter a level of damage we want to prevent. If, for instance, plain milk 
turns out to be chocolate, a customer can arrive at a store for a 
refund. If the action happens repeatedly, or on a mass scale, a class 
may sue. But if the milk is poisoned, the damage to health cannot 
easily be undone. It makes sense to regularly inspect milk-producing 
facilities to assure that basic safeguards of pasteurization are in place. 
B. Classification, Quality, and Safety Assurance in Health 
Information Technology 
All of the classic rationales for certification and licensing are in 
place in the case of HIT. In terms of classification, it is now clear that 
the HIT industry is diverse and fragmented and likely to remain so 
for the foreseeable future.23 As the eminent legal analyst of HIT, 
Nicolas Terry, has observed, IT staff have been “seeking to support 
individual clinical units” and thus are often adopting “fragmented 
HIT ‘solutions,’ such as freestanding computerized physician order 
entry or basic EMRs [electronic medical records].”24 Some may 
dream of a disruptive innovator like Apple or Google sweeping in 
and consolidating existing technologies.25 But that future is a long way 
off—if it is coming at all. In the meantime, we are stuck with trying to 
make sense of multiple systems, which must be coordinated in some 
way if the full advantages of big data methods in health care are to be 
 
 22. As an example, the quality and safety of electronic cigarette cartridges currently 
are not regulated by the FDA although the Agency recently submitted proposals for 
guidance. See New & Events, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/newsevents 
/publichealthfocus/ucm172906.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2014). Until a final rule is in 
place, any manufacturer can create its own flavored cartridges and sell them to consumers 
without guaranteeing the safety or quality of the ingredients. 
 23. Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 
NEV. L.J. 722, 742 (2013). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Donald W. Simborg, Don Eugene Detmer & Eta S. Berner, The Wave has 
Finally Broken: Now What?, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N e21, e23 (2013) (stating 
that “[s]uch a difficult market environment clearly inhibits the entry of new approaches 
to” electronic health records because the limited number of vendors that actually control 
the market prevents innovation and entry by other players). 
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realized. Classification is the first step toward assuring rational policy 
in the area.26 
In terms of quality, HIT is about as close to a “credence good” as 
one can come.27 It is very hard to fully assess the functionality of 
software until after one has used it in a variety of settings. Moreover, 
security concerns may arise only after a long period of use and may 
need a constantly evolving set of responses. The ongoing relationship 
between IT vendor and health care provider is so fraught with 
opportunities for one-sided contracts and unactionable neglect that it 
has been satirized in a widely shared website.28 Providers may not 
estimate the risk of vendor problems properly or may contract away 
vital rights.29 
Just as in health care generally, the question of safety in health 
care technology is vital.30 The safety worries about health information 
technology both overlap with and are distinct from worries about 
health technology generally. But as these systems are increasingly 
integrated, misfires in the informational sector become more 
dangerous in the realm of treatment delivery. To borrow a phrasing 
of William Gibson: we are witnessing an “ever[sion]” of health 
 
 26. See 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11(c)(5) (2012) (giving the Office of the National 
Coordinator for HIT the responsibility to “keep or recognize a program . . . for the 
voluntary certification of health information technology”). 
 27. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970) (discussing economic models involving 
“trust” and uncertain quality); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics 
of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 947, 965–66 (1963) (discussing behaviors 
influenced by information inequality in a medical context); Michael R. Darby & Edi 
Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68–72 
(1973) (exploring credence goods where quality cannot be evaluated through normal use 
but only at additional cost). 
 28. Welcome to Extormity, EXTORMITY, http://www.extormity.com/ (last visited May 
7, 2014). 
 29. The federal government’s HIT website recommends the weighing of numerous 
factors to ensure a clinical decision support system’s (“CDS”) efficacy, such as the 
measure of CDS satisfaction and usability, workflow impact, utilization, and unintended 
consequences. Measure Effects and Refine CDS Interventions, HEALTH IT, http://www. 
healthit.gov/sites/default/files/3-4-5-measure-effects-and-refine-cds-interv.pdf (last visited 
May 7, 2014).  
 30. See Walt Bogdanich & Kristina Rebelo, A Pinpoint Beam Strays Invisibly, 
Harming Instead of Healing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2010, at A1 (highlighting how medical 
devices that require pinpoint accuracy can cause great damage to patients when set up 
incorrectly); Nicolas P. Terry, When the Machine That Goes Ping Causes Harm, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 37, 58–59 (2002) (noting that the medical professional-centered tort liability 
system currently governing health care improperly “permit[s] health care entities to shift 
costs associated with ameliorating technologies” to patients). 
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information technology, an increasingly seamless integration of their 
digital forms into the fabric of everyday treatment decisions.31 
C. The Current Landscape of Health Information Technology 
Certification and Licensing 
An Electronic Health Record (“EHR”) is defined by statute as 
“an electronic record of health-related information on an individual 
that is created, gathered, managed, and consulted by authorized 
health care clinicians and staff.”32 Since the second Bush 
administration, health policymakers have been focused on getting 
more providers to use digital medical record systems.33 The critical 
legislative step toward realizing that goal was the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 
(“HITECH”).34 HITECH established the first subsidies for those 
providers meaningfully using health records.35 By 2016, those 
subsidies will convert to penalties for Medicare reimbursements of 
those not using EHRs; the carrot turns into a stick.36 The idea here 
was to prevent providers from simply, say, putting a transcript of a 
patient visit into Microsoft Word, calling that process “adoption of 
EHR,” and getting subsidies for it. About thirty-five billion dollars in 
subsidies were appropriated for this purpose.37 
The rationale here was that, once medical records were fully 
computerized in systems with a rich set of functionalities and 
interoperability capabilities, savings would follow and quality of care 
 
 31. William Gibson, Google’s Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at A23. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 17921(5) (2012). 
 33. See Nicolas P. Terry, Anticipating Stage Two: Assessing the Development of 
Meaningful Use and EMR Deployment, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 103, 103 (2012). See 
generally Catherine M. DesRoches et al., Electronic Health Records in Ambulatory Care: 
A National Survey of Physicians, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50 (2008) (studying the use of 
EHRs in ambulatory care); Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. 
Hospitals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1628 (2009) (studying the use of EHRs in U.S. 
hospitals). 
 34. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), Pub. L. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). For further discussion of 
meaningful use, see Mark Faccenda & Lara Parkin, Meaningful Use—What Does It Mean 
to You?, 23 HEALTH L. 10, 10 (2011) (citing the ARRA). 
 35. See Bob Brown, What Is a “Certified EHR”?, 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 
31, 31 (2010); Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing Adoption of 
Electronic Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 46 (2011). 
 36. Terry, supra note 35, at 50. 
 37. Rob Girling, The Elusive Promise of Electronic Health Records, MEDCITYNEWS 
(Jan. 20, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://medcitynews.com/2014/01/elusive-promise-electronic-
health-records/.  
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would improve.38 The law is designed to do more than subsidize; it 
conditions funding on the “meaningful use” of electronic medical 
records.39 “Meaningful use” regulations define how functional an 
EHR system has to be before its user can receive subsidies.40 Over a 
six-year period, these regulations will be implemented in three 
stages.41 Their purpose is to incentivize improvements to quality, 
safety, efficiency, and care coordination; engage patients and families; 
and improve population health—all while protecting privacy, 
confidentiality, and security.42 As such, EHRs must at least include 
basic information such as patient demographics, clinical health 
information, and medical history.43 
The HITECH Act also mandates that the Department of Health 
and Human Services (“DHHS”) establish procedures for certifying 
HIT so that providers can be assured that their technology meets 
basic standards.44 Self-regulation would not adequately vindicate the 
interests of all stakeholders.45 To ensure optimal data use, basic 
 
 38. A meta-study concluded that ninety-two percent of recent articles on HIT did find 
positive benefits overall. See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Benefits of Health 
Information Technology: A Review of the Recent Literature Shows Predominantly Positive 
Results, 30 HEALTH AFF. 464, 466–67 (2011). 
 39. See Camella B. Boateng, Federal Electronic Health Records Incentive Programs: 
What They Mean for Compliance Officers, 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 17, 18 
(2010) (“The meaningful use objectives are divided into two groups: (1) core set and (2) 
menu set objectives. The core set contains 14 required objectives that eligible hospitals 
must fulfill to receive bonus payments. The menu set has 10 objectives, and hospitals must 
select and meet five objectives for payment purposes.”). 
 40. See David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for 
Electronic Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010). 
 41. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,328 (proposed July 
28, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 422) (listing the “core set of meaningful use 
objectives” for Stage 1). Capabilities include: recording smoking status and body mass 
index; presenting clinical data on individual patients, including medication list, medication 
allergy list, problem and current diagnosis list, and a clinical summary; generating lists of 
patients by specific condition and allowing communication with patients for reminders and 
such; allowing patients timely access to their EHR; and allowing providers to submit 
claims for payment and information to public health authorities electronically. Id. 
 42. Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of 
Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 691–96 (2007). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 300jj(13) (2012). 
 44. See Health Information Technology Standards, 45 C.F.R. § 170 (2013); Proposed 
Establishment of Certification Programs for Health Information Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 
11,328 (proposed Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170); Health Information 
Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification 
Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,590 (proposed July 28, 
2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170). 
 45. See Melissa M. Goldstein & Jane Hyatt Thorpe, The First Anniversary of the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act: The 
Regulatory Outlook for Implementation, 7 PERSPECTIVES HEALTH INFO. MGMT. 1, 4 
CITE AS 92 N.C.L. REV. 1661 (2014) 
1672 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92 
 
benchmarks for data entry and portability are needed. Certified 
EHRs must include capacities that “enable providers to achieve 
meaningful use as it is currently constituted in Phase 1 of HHS’ 
regulations.”46 The Office of the National Coordinator for Health 
Information Technology (“ONC”)47 delegates certification authority 
to Authorized Testing and Certification Bodies (“ATCBs” or 
“ACBs”), which will follow standards developed by the International 
Organization for Standardization.48 
The meaningful use and certification standards are a 
comprehensive, complex effort to create rules and standards that can 
support a twenty-first century HIT infrastructure. This effort heavily 
depended on cooperation between public and private partners.49 The 
chain of certifications between DHHS and HIT vendors essentially 
extends via the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) to the ATCBs.50 There are currently six approved ATCBs, 
and all were approved in 2010.51 There are six accredited testing 
laboratories.52 The same company can be both a certification body 
 
(2010) (arguing that EHR technology previously certified by the Certification Commission 
for Healthcare Information Technology (“CCHIT”) before the ARRA was “difficult to 
use . . . and [was] not designed to meet ARRA’s goals of improving quality and efficiency 
in the healthcare system”). 
 46. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Meaningful Use and Certification of Health 
Information Technology: What About Safety?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS S77, S78 (2012) 
[hereinafter Meaningful Use]; see Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: 
The Case for Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 103, 146 (2008) (claiming that a committee of practitioners, rather than “HIT 
industry personnel,” would be more “likely to prioritize the best interests of practitioners 
and patients over the interests of industry and thus to subject EHR systems to rigorous 
evaluation,” but not directly criticizing ATCBs, which had not been certified at this point 
in time). 
 47. The ONC is organizationally located within DHHS and “is the principal federal 
entity charged with coordination of nationwide efforts to implement and use the most 
advanced health information technology and the electronic exchange of health 
information.” About ONC, HEALTH IT, httphttp://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/about-onc 
(last visited May 7, 2014). 
 48. Principles of Proper Conduct for ONC-ATCBs, 45 C.F.R. § 170.423 (2013). 
 49. Public-private partnerships are necessary to the prevention of health care fraud 
more generally. See Public-Private Partnership to Prevent Health Care Fraud, STOP 
MEDICARE FRAUD, http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/public-private/index 
.html (last visited May 7, 2014). 
 50. Permanent Certification Program for HIT, 45 C.F.R. §§ 170.500–170.599 (2013). 
 51. Certification Programs & Policy: Authorized Testing and Certification Bodies, 
HEALTH IT, http://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/authorized-testing-
and-certifications-bodies (last visited May 7, 2014). 
 52. Directory of Accredited Laboratories: Healthcare Information Technology Testing, 
NAT. VOLUNTARY LAB. ACCREDITATION PROGRAM, http://ts.nist.gov/standards/scopes 
/hit.htm (last visited May 7, 2014). 
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and a laboratory as long as there is a “strong firewall between the two 
programs.”53 
Nevertheless, critical voices still question whether the 
certification standards (and those implementing them) are optimal. 
For instance, they may not be adequately tailored to the diverse 
specialties in medicine.54 Small providers also may want to seek 
special allowances or tailored programs.55 Diversity of regions also 
may not be taken into account; one can imagine, for instance, that the 
competitive landscape of providers is much different in, say, Boca 
Raton, Florida, than Billings, Montana.56 Like some of the small 
groups or individual policyholders who had their policies cancelled in 
the wake of implementation of many aspects of ACA insurance 
regulation, these small providers may feel that federal guidance is 
unduly Procrustean.57 
Physicians have complained that administrators focus too much 
on profitability and return on investment, and minimize the input of 
frontline providers who may want more functionalities or 
safeguards.58 Moreover, ongoing security and maintenance concerns 
 
 53. Getting Started with Certification: Certification Bodies & Testing Laboratories, 
HEALTH IT, http://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/certification-bodies-
testing-laboratories (last visited May 7, 2014). 
 54. See Robert S. Miller, Electronic Health Record Certification in Oncology: Role of 
the Certification Commission for Health Information Technology, 7 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 
209, 210–11 (2011) (explaining that the “CCHIT Certified program is voluntary and its 
testing criteria are created by experts with domain and specialty expertise, whereas ONC-
ATCB certification is mandated by the federal government for those wishing to collect 
meaningful use incentive dollars, with criteria established in published government rules” 
and later referring to the CCHIT program as “robust”). 
 55. See Sowmya R. Rao et al., Electronic Health Records in Small Physician Practices: 
Availability, Use, and Perceived Benefits, 18 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 271, 275 
(2011) (criticizing the certification program for failing to take notice of the special 
challenges facing small providers). 
 56. See, e.g., Joshua R. Vest, Jangho Yoon & Brian H. Bossak, Changes to the 
Electronic Health Records Market in Light of Health Information Technology Certification 
and Meaningful Use, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 227, 231 (2013) (arguing for 
“targeted” HIT policies regarding certification because vendor competition varies 
geographically). 
 57. Regarding the position of policyholders impacted by ACA regulation 
implementation, see Actually, You Can’t “Keep It,” ON THE MEDIA (Nov. 1, 2013), http:// 
www.onthemedia.org/story/actually-you-cant-keep-it/transcript/# (noting 9 million 
potentially cancelled insurance policies and occasional cases of discontent). 
 58. See Simborg, Detmer & Berner, supra note 25, at e22 (explaining that physicians 
who use EHR continue to report dissatisfaction with the usability and interface). The 
authors attribute the dissatisfaction to the different nature of EHR, as compared to other 
consumer programs, because EHR systems are typically purchased by administrators, who 
are focused on profitability and return on investment. As such, vendors have focused on 
these traits, and physician input may be minimized. Id. The authors also cite market 
dynamics as a reason EHR has not reached its full potential because five EHR vendors 
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cannot be addressed in a single, one-off licensing.59 Renewal of 
certification may be an important aspect of future regulatory 
structures. Moreover, ATCBs (or other entities) ought to be more 
open to assessing the ongoing performance of vendors.60 By adopting 
relatively easy-to-understand ranking and rating systems, they could 
help avoid the classic “lemons market” problem by translating 
performance on a variety of metrics into a relatively straightforward 
assessment of the comparative merits of various vendors. 
There are also price levels among ATCBs that deserve further 
investigation.61 DHHS has declined “to dictate the minimum or 
maximum amount an ONC–ACB should be able to charge for 
certifying a Complete EHR or EHR Module,” relying instead on a 
competitive market of “multiple ONC–ACBs” to reduce costs.62 
DHHS also has stated that additional regulatory controls are 
unnecessary because ONC-ACBs must “comply with Guide 65, which 
requires certification bodies to make their services accessible to all 
applicants whose activities fall within its declared field of operation 
 
account for fifty percent of the market share. Id. at e23 (“Such a dif•cult market 
environment clearly inhibits the entry of new approaches to EHR.” (citing Joseph 
Goedert, Research Tracks Physician I.T. Adoption in 2012, HEALTH DATA MGMT. (Sept. 
28, 2012), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/ad_includes/welcome.html)). 
 59. See Hardeep Singh, David C. Classen & Dean F. Sittig, Creating an Oversight 
Infrastructure for Electronic Health Record-Related Patient Safety Hazards, 7 J. PATIENT 
SAFETY 169, 169 (2011) (“[ATCB certification] does not guarantee that EHRs will 
actually be implemented and work as planned; therefore, ongoing system evaluations and 
modifications are necessary. At present, it is unclear which single agency is responsible for 
EHR oversight.”). 
 60. See Amanda Parsons & Winfred Wu, In Response To: Electronic Health Records 
in Small Physician Practices: Availability, Use, and Perceived Benefits, 18 J. AM. MED. 
INFORMATICS ASS’N 726, 726 (2011) (advocating for organizations to assist small 
providers in their use of EHR and claiming that “EHR certification programs like ONC 
ATCB should take into account vendor performance and user reviews, as well as ensuring 
that vendors have correctly coded key functionality, like measures of clinical quality and 
meaningful use metrics”). 
 61. Stephen Barlas, Hospitals Scramble to Meet Deadlines for Adopting Electronic 
Health Records: Pharmacy Systems Will Be Updated Slowly but Surely, 36 PHARMACY & 
THERAPEUTICS 37, 40 (2011) (describing the different prices between ACTBs as a 
“thorny issue” and explaining that “CCHIT charges vendors more for certifying [for 
multiple uses, including non-HITECH criteria,] a full EHR system compared with 
Drummond, which charges $19,000; InfoGard’s price is $19,400”). 
 62. Establishment of the Permanent Certification for Health Information Technology, 
76 Fed. Reg. 1262, 1314 (Jan. 7, 2011); see id. at 1279 (“[T]he actual costs of testing and 
certification may be lower than our estimates due to factors such as competitive pricing 
and/or lower costs attributable to gap certification.”); id. at 1307 (“Aside from the 
requirements discussed above, we do not specify the fees or any other processes that an 
ONC–ACB must follow before granting certified status to a newer version of a previously 
certified Complete EHR or EHR Module based on the submitted attestation.”). 
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. . . , including not having any undue financial or other conditions.”63 
But there is justifiable worry that there may eventually be price 
competition that could erode the ability of the certification bodies to 
improve their analysis and tempt them to lower standards. 
Critics also go beyond complaining about ATCBs to a focus on 
ONC itself.64 Joseph Conn has argued that “the five ONC-approved 
independent testing and certification bodies can’t do their jobs 
because several essential testing ‘tools’—custom-made software 
programs government contractors developed for the ONC—have not 
been completely debugged.”65 For example, Conn notes as follows: 
On Jan. 23, Carol Bean, director of the ONC’s certification 
office, sent a memo to the testing and certification bodies, 
acknowledging problems with a different tool, the program’s 
Transport Test Tool. That tool, developed for ONC with help 
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology, is 
designed to test EHRs on Stage 2 requirements for exchange of 
patient-care summaries and other secure messages, important 
first steps under the program in a long march toward EHR 
interoperability.66 
Repeated delays in the implementation of more advanced 
International Classification of Diseases nomenclature have also 
created some uncertainty and frustration among vendors and 
providers—though the ONC would certainly have provoked even 
more uncertainty and frustration had it simply barreled ahead with 
the plan to move from roughly 14,000 to over 140,000 categories.67 
These problems give some ammunition to those who would shift 
toward a more privatized model of EHR quality maintenance.68 
 
 63. Id. at 1309; see id. at 1268 (citing ISO/IEC Guide 65:1996, INT’L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION). Guide 65 is incorporated into the code at 42 C.F.R. § 170.599(b)(2). 
 64. Joseph Conn, Certified Trouble: Vendors Wait for Feds to Debug EHR Testing 
Tools, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 28, 2013, at 12–13 (detailing the problems developers 
have had getting software approved for the 2014 Stage 2 requirements because the ONC 
has not provided the certification bodies with properly functioning testing programs). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  
 67. See Joseph Conn, Riding the Wave: As Federal EHR Incentives Recede, the Next 
Surge in Health IT Spending Begins to Take Shape, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 20, 
2013, at 7 (citing sources that believe “ ‘EHRs have peaked,’ . . . but it doesn’t follow that 
overall healthcare IT sales will be dragged down”). Other potential sources of HIT 
spending include the government-mandated conversion to ICD-10 billing. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Jonathon H. Roth, Note, Regulating Your Medical History without 
Regulations: A Private Regulatory Framework to Electronic Health Record Adoption, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 2103, 2118–20 (2011). 
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Nevertheless, given the critical functionalities involved, there 
must be some public mandates for baseline levels of quality 
assurance. There is an ongoing need for public-private partnership: 
most of the relevant infrastructure will always be in private hands, but 
its owners do not have adequate incentives to maximize or even 
optimize outcomes. For example, we might rely on the tort system to 
deter gross failures in record systems. Certainly a jury would be 
sympathetic to claims resulting from a foreseeable meltdown of a 
system.69 But what of the thousands or even millions of people who 
might benefit from careful and comprehensive data collection that 
would enable data analysis that could in turn lead to far better 
treatment repertoires? 
In 2011, EHR experts Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski 
sounded another note of alarm about the development of digitized 
health infrastructure.70 They argued that early rounds of regulations 
relating to HIT failed to address safety concerns. “General system 
safety is a property that is attainable only through rigorous processes 
for development and evaluation,” they noted, but they felt that the 
CCHIT was not capable of providing such processes.71 It still remains 
to be seen whether ATCBs are up to this task. 
II.  CMS’S FRAUD-DETECTION CONTRACTORS 
In any large government program, there always are a few bad 
apples looking to exploit the system.72 The question for CMS was how 
to guard the American taxpayers’ funds as some of the largest 
government programs on the planet disbursed funds to hundreds of 
thousands of entities.73 Given the sheer volume and complexity of the 
transactions involved, and broader neoliberal resistance to 
 
 69. Of course, we should not be too reliant on the tort system either. EHR failures are 
potentially opportunities for multiple parties to shift blame among one another, obscuring 
causation and making it very difficult to find out exactly who was responsible for any given 
error. 
 70. Hoffman and Podgurski anticipated these concerns in 2009. See Sharona Hoffman 
& Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and Electronic Health Record 
Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1527 (2009); Meaningful Use, supra note 46, at 
S78. 
 71. See Meaningful Use, supra note 46, at S78. 
 72. See Lewis Morris & Gary W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government’s Stick 
and Carrot Approach to Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 322 (1999) 
(providing that, while the public may believe health care fraud to be widespread, 
“government spokespersons have continuously acknowledged that most providers deal 
with the federal health care programs in an honest and ethical manner”).  
 73. See id. at 321 (highlighting government audits that suggested more than $20 billion 
a year in Medicare overpayments were made in the mid-1990s). 
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government hiring, CMS had little choice but to involve contractors 
to detect and deter fraud.74 
The same technological and legal revolutions that have 
eviscerated personal privacy are starting to transform law 
enforcement.75 Directed at the right targets, data mining and 
pervasive surveillance can advance our understanding of the social 
world, and they might even prevent the types of massive 
misallocations of resources that have led to “triple fails” in the U.S. 
health care system: unnecessary spending that does nothing to 
improve outcomes but also manages to reduce access to the system.76 
There are many routes to fraud and abuse in the programs.77 
Examples of Medicare fraud include as follows: 
Billing for services that [a physician] did not actually render; 
[b]illing for services that were not medically necessary; [b]illing 
for services that were performed by an improperly or 
unsupervised employee; [b]illing for services that were 
performed by an employee who has been excluded from 
participation in Federal Health Care programs; [b]illing for 
services of such low quality that they are virtually worthless; 
and [b]illing separately for services already included in a global 
fee . . . .78 
Medicare abuse results from activities that unnecessarily increase 
costs to Medicare and involve practices that are not in the best 
interest of patient care or that are not medically necessary.79 
According to one estimate by fraud examiners, about $133 billion of 
 
 74. See REBECCA SALTIEL BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD: AUDITING AND 
DETECTION GUIDE 14–15 (2d ed. 2012). 
 75. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE HIDDEN ALGORITHMS 
BEHIND MONEY AND INFORMATION ch. 5 (forthcoming 2014). 
 76. For a definition of “triple fail” events, see Geraint Lewis et al., How Health 
Systems Could Avert “Triple Fail” Events That Are Harmful, Are Costly, and Result in 
Poor Patient Satisfaction, 32 HEALTH AFF. 669, 669–70 (2013). 
 77. See, e.g., MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL: HOW FRAUD BLEEDS 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 40 (2000) (discussing one way in which perpetrators 
of health care fraud can find, and then exploit, weaknesses in claims payment systems). 
 78. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE: PREVENTION, DETECTION AND REPORTING 6 
(2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-
Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Fraud_and_Abuse.pdf. This document also 
mentions “[m]isusing codes on a claim, [c]harging excessively for services or supplies, and 
[b]illing for services that were not medically necessary.” Id. at 2. 
 79. Id.; see also, e.g., Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, A Hospital Chain’s Inquiry 
Cited Unneeded Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A1 (discussing allegations that a 
hospital was performing unnecessary procedures on patients). 
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all payments by CMS in 2008 were distributed improperly due to the 
filing of illegitimate claims.80 
CMS uses private contractors to process Medicare claims and 
investigate fraud perpetrated by providers, beneficiaries, and third-
parties.81 For many purposes, including routine claims processing and 
audits, such entities are entirely qualified to exercise judgment, catch 
errors, and educate providers on how to avoid such errors in the 
future.82 However, as they have shouldered more responsibilities, 
these contractors are facing opposition.83 Their internal processes can 
be obscure. Providers often feel confused and frustrated.84 A critical 
mass of complaints indicates that the deputization of important 
powers to private contractors in the areas of fraud investigation and 
payment recoupment needs better supervision.85  
 
 80. Jeffrey R. Helton, Avoiding Fraud Risks Associated with EHRs, HEALTH FIN. 
MGMT., July 2010, at 76, 78. 
 81. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, PUB. NO. 100-08, MEDICARE 
PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL §§ 1.1–1.3, available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Internet-Only-Manuals-IOMs-Items/CMS019033.html 
(describing CMS contractors and their tasks); see also id. §§ 4.1–4.2 (describing Medicare 
fraud and fraud investigation). 
 82. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS, IMPROPER MEDICARE FEE-FOR-
SERVICE PAYMENTS REPORT NOVEMBER 2009 1, 23 (2009), available at http://www.cms 
.gov/CERT/Downloads/CERT_Report.pdf. 
 83. AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PROGRAM INTEGRITY: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER VALUE AND EFFICIENCY 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/washington/medicare-medicaid-program-integrity 
.pdf; Dani Grigg, Medical Suppliers in Idaho and Nationwide Scramble to Keep Up with 
Surging Medicare Audits, IDAHO BUS. REV., June 29, 2012 (describing provider and 
supplier disenchantment).  
 84. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 83, at 2 (“MACs have discretion to require an 
unlimited number of medical records. And, while the Medicare RACs have similar 
appeals processes to the MACs, each Medicaid RAC may have a different appeals 
process. Consequently, physicians spend a great deal of time determining which contractor 
is auditing them, under what authority, and what the guidelines are for response. This 
confusion and misspent time unduly burdens physicians and contravenes the swift 
recoupment of improper payments to the federal government . . . . [Thus] CMS has 
committed to undertake an ‘Audit of Audits’ to review the myriad federal audit contrac-
tors and identify areas of duplication.”). 
 85. See Letter from Sens. Max Baucus, Orrin G. Hatch, Ron Wyden, Tom Coburn, 
Tom Carper, & Charles E. Grassley to Members of the Health Care Community (May 2, 
2012), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/download/?id=85cc3 
a87-5714-4d93-8cf1-0a338a33083a (requesting ideas from medical professionals regarding 
how to best combat issues of health care fraud and waste). 
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A. Background on Fraud Investigations 
Fraud investigations in the Medicare and the Medicaid programs 
have evolved over time.86 The Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 200387 (“MMA”) authorized 
CMS to replace Fiscal Intermediaries (“FIs”) with Medicare 
Administrative Contractors (“MACs”)88 and to replace Program 
Safety Contractors (“PSCs”) with Zone Program Integrity 
Contractors (“ZPICs”).89 Recovery Auditors (“RAs,” formerly 
“RACs,” Recovery Audit Contractors) have been in development 
since the MMA, but the program was officially mandated after the 
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.90 The Comprehensive Error 
Rate Testing program (“CERT”) was established after the Improper 
Payments Information Act of 2002.91 
Fraud prevention and investigation begins when a provider 
submits a claim to a MAC or when an individual submits a complaint 
to either the Beneficiary Contact Center or to any other agency 
equipped to receive fraud complaints.92 The MAC reviews claims for 
abnormal activity based on identified vulnerabilities and tries to 
resolve them.93 It also receives complaints that cannot be resolved.94 If 
the MAC finds evidence of fraud, it refers the claim to the ZPIC, 
which investigates further.95 The ZPIC can also refer the case to law 
enforcement for civil or criminal investigation.96 RAs conduct 
extensive post-payment reviews of claims in order to identify and 
 
 86. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
OEI-04-11-00101, VULNERABILITIES IN CMS’S AND CONTRACTORS’ ACTIVITIES TO 
DETECT AND DETER FRAUD IN COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS 6 n.27, 8 n.45 
(2013) (explaining that not all legacy contractors had been replaced). 
 87. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 88. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 86, at 5. 
 89. Id. at 7–8. 
 90. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-522, MEDICARE PROGRAM 
INTEGRITY: INCREASING CONSISTENCY OF CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS MAY 
IMPROVE ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY 10–11 (2013); Tax Relief and Health Care Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 91. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 90, at 11; Improper Payments 
Information Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-300, 116 Stat. 2350. CERT is responsible for 
calculating MAC improper payment rates. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 90, at 15 tbl. 2. Although CERT conducts activities related to fraud prevention, such 
as identifying vulnerabilities, CERT refers improper payments to the MAC. Id. at 19.  
 92. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 81, § 4 
(describing the benefit integrity program). 
 93. Id. §§ 2.1–2.2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. § 4.2. 
 96. Id. § 4.18.1. 
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recoup improper payments.97 MACs process the overpayments RAs 
identify and conduct the appeals process.98  
MACs have primary responsibility to prevent and investigate 
Medicare fraud. They can prevent payments to providers.99 ZPICs 
also investigate suspected cases of fraud.100 Both types of contractors 
have access to extensive data and the capabilities to analyze it.101 
ZPICs use internal data analysis to prevent and detect fraud.102 
Given the ubiquity of cameras, sensors, and “guard labor,”103 
advanced industrial societies have opportunities to prevent crime in 
the twenty-first century that may have been considered “science 
fiction” in the twentieth.104 Professor Michael Rich has even recently 
asked, “Should we make crime impossible?”105 The stakes of 
pervasive, constant, data-driven surveillance are high. As Evgeny 
Morozov observed recently, systems like PredPol106 have been used 
by police forces to predict with sometimes uncanny accuracy the 
likelihood of crime happening in a given area.107 Digital environments 
for health care claim entry should, in principle, be even more 
susceptible to a “panoptic sort”—an all-seeing aggregation of 
 
 97. See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PUB. NO. 100-06, 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MANUAL §§ 100.1-100.15 (2013), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Downloads/fin106c04 
.pdf (providing further information on the functions of Recovery Auditors). 
 98. Id. § 100.5. 
 99. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 81, § 3.7. 
 100. Id. § 4.2. 
 101. See generally id. § 2 (describing the types of data and analysis). 
 102. See Sara Kay Wheeler, Stephanie L. Fuller & J. Austin Broussard, Meet the Fraud 
Busters: Program Safeguard Contractors and Zone Program Integrity Contractors, 4 J. 
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 15–16 (describing data analysis responsibilities of PSCs and 
ZPICs). 
 103. See generally Arjun Jayadev & Samuel Bowles, Guard Labor, 79 J. DEV. ECON. 
238 (2006) (defining “guard labor”). 
 104. See James Byrne & Gary Marx, Technological Innovations in Crime Prevention 
and Policing. A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact, J. POLICE 
STUDIES, Sept. 2011, at 17, 22–25 (discussing crime prevention innovations including risk 
classification tools and protections for data privacy). 
 105. Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 795, 796 (2013) (discussing “ ‘impossibility structures,’ government mandates that 
aim to make certain classes of criminal conduct effectively impossible” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 106. PredPol is a computer system that analyzes data on past crime patterns to predict 
where and when future law-breaking will occur. See About, PREDPOL, http://www.predpol 
.com/about/ (last visited May 7, 2014) 
 107. EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM 250 (2013). 
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multiple data sources designed to identify troubling behavior.108 That 
was one central motivating factor behind the extensive delegations of 
investigative authority to fraud contractors, acquiesced to by 
providers themselves as part of Medicare Conditions on 
Participation.109 
The effort got off to a rocky start. PSCs did not make adequate 
use of proactive fraud prevention and investigation techniques like 
data analysis.110 CMS’s oversight of both PSCs and ZPICs left 
something to be desired, suggesting a larger problem in excess 
outsourcing and contracting out: the declining ability of the 
government to monitor and control the sprawling array of contractors 
that it has created.111 The overarching issue is that a federal 
government that has become so reliant on contractors may be losing 
its ability to assess the functionality and value of contractors’ 
handiwork.112 
For example, the mandated transfer of responsibilities from 
PSCs to ZPICs was fraught with difficulties. While ZPICs were 
supposed to rely on data analysis, their work remained, like the PSCs, 
driven more by beneficiary complaints.113 External sources of 
information, such as beneficiary complaints, can be less reliable and 
more scattershot than internal data analysis.114 The hope for 
advocates of data-driven fraud prevention and investigation is that 
the detection of problematic behavior can become more systematic 
 
 108. See David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile 
Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL 
DISCRIMINATION 20 (David Lyon ed., 2003) (discussing the role of searchable databases 
in everyday surveillance and the use of such tools in classifying individuals and groups). 
The term “panoptic sort” comes from the work of Oscar Gandy. See OSCAR H. GANDY, 
THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 15 (1993). 
 109. See Wheeler, Fuller & Broussard, supra note 102 (“PSCs and ZPICs are expected 
to engage in proactive and comprehensive data analysis to identify actual or potential 
claim payment errors and potential fraud.”). 
 110. See Memorandum from the Inspector Gen. to the Sec’y of DHHS, Top 
Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Health and Human 
Services in Fiscal Year 2011 (Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-
publications/top-challenges/2011/2011-tcm.pdf. 
 111. See FREEMAN & MINOW, supra note 8, at 3. See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 1–6 (2007) (discussing the tension between efficiency and 
accountability when governmental tasks are outsourced to private entities). 
 112. See FREEMAN & MINOW, supra note 8, at 3; Pierce, supra note 8, at 1218. 
 113. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-04-11-
00220, CMS AND CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT OF HOME HEALTH AGENCIES 16 (2012) 
(noting that “investigations of 192 of 255 (75 percent) [Home Health Agencies] were 
initiated from external sources. . . . [such as] beneficiary complaints”). 
 114. Id. CMS responded that the agency will be updating its analytical models and the 
statement of work for ZPICs. Id. at 21. 
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once a large enough dataset has established the predicates for 
troubling behavior. 
To understand how this might work (and the relevance of 
automated pattern-recognition to law enforcement generally), 
consider recent reporting on Target’s use of data.115 The massive 
retailer prides itself on knowing a great deal about its customers—
including whether they are pregnant.116 The pattern recognition was 
relatively easy. First, Target’s statisticians compiled a database of “the 
known pregnant”—people who had signed up for its baby registries.117 
They then compared the purchases in that dataset to the purchases 
made by Target shoppers as a whole.118 By analyzing where the 
pregnant shoppers diverged the most from the general dataset, they 
could find various “signals” of pregnancy-related purchases.119 In the 
first twenty weeks, “supplements like calcium, magnesium and zinc” 
were a tip-off.120 Later in the pregnancy, “scent-free soap and extra-
big bags of cotton balls” were common purchases.121 By the end of the 
analysis, statisticians compiled a list of twenty-five products that 
contributed to a “pregnancy prediction score” and due date 
estimator.122 For example, if a twenty-three year old woman in 
Atlanta bought “cocoa-butter lotion, a purse large enough to double 
as a diaper bag, zinc and magnesium supplements and a bright blue 
rug” in March, Target estimated an eighty-seven percent chance she is 
pregnant and due to give birth in late August.123 
Now consider the application of the same methods in the fraud 
and abuse context. CMS already has access to a critical mass of 
complaints regarding fraudulent contractors and to digitized records 
of their past patterns of filing claims for reimbursement.124 A 
 
 115. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=2&. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (explaining that every Target shopper has a “Guest ID” number, tied to a 
credit card, email address, or other identifier).  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. In at least one case, the company mailed coupons for pregnancy-related items 
to the house of a teen who had not yet told her father she was pregnant. When other 
customers found the pregnancy-related ads creepy, Target responded—not by explaining 
its data collection to customers, but by mixing more non-pregnancy-related ads into the 
circulars targeting expectant mothers. Id. 
 124. CMS maintains a national database of Medicaid claims, administered by the 
Medicaid Integrity Group. See MEDICAID INTEGRITY GRP., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
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relatively simple approach to the problem of fraud would compare 
any new set of claims to the extant database of fraudulent claims. If 
characteristics of the new claim are too similar to characteristics of 
fraudulent claims, then the new claim can be flagged for further 
inspection. 
As this example suggests, fraud detection via pattern recognition 
can be a powerful, but also flawed, tool. At what point is there a 
critical mass of similarity? Can “flagging” involve delay or hassle so 
severe that it ought to count as a punishment in and of itself? If so, 
are we comfortable as a society with meting out this punishment via a 
largely automated process? Finally, we must consider whether, in the 
interest of transparency, contractors and the public at large deserve 
access to the entire dataset, or whether this would merely encourage 
gaming the system. To elaborate on the last point, consider what 
might happen if writers could easily and costlessly register to run 
largely copied work through Turnitin, the plagiarism detection 
database system. They might feed this work into the system to check 
if their copying is detected. If so, they might alter it slightly and feed it 
in again, repeatedly, in order to find out what might be just enough 
alteration to beat the system. Policymakers would not want to allow 
that kind of “gaming” of a fraud detection system. On the other hand, 
there probably are alternative sources for much of the data, and in 
the absence of public access, those who are privileged or wealthy 
enough to access that data might essentially be able to “figure out” 
the system in ways that others cannot.125 
This may seem like a merely theoretical concern, but it raises 
deep questions about the nature of law and the division of labor 
between attorneys, technologists, and auditors. To the extent we 
conceive of “flagging” a claim as punishment itself, the automated 
system is a set of rules similar to law: there is a penalty for violating it, 
and it is operated by entities under the aegis of state authority. On the 
other hand, this is a kind of detection that, like the IRS’s tax audit 
 
MEDICAID SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAID INTEGRITY PLAN OF THE MEDICAID 
INTEGRITY PROGRAM 10 (2009), available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/DeficitReductionAct/downloads/CMIP2009-2013.pdf. Medicare 
claims information is centralized in the Integrated Data Repository (“IDR”), where it is 
available for advanced mining and analysis. CMS Integrated Data Repository, IT 
DASHBOARD, https://www.itdashboard.gov/investment?buscid=279 (last updated Aug. 30, 
2013). Ultimately, CMS plans to utilize the IDR as the “single repository that [will] serve[] 
as the centerpiece of CMS’ data needs and [will] enable cross-functional analysis” for both 
Medicaid and Medicare claims information. Id. 
 125. See Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 235–36 (2011). 
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flags, might work optimally only to the extent that others cannot 
reverse engineer it.126 We will need to think creatively about 
reconciling these two divergent visions of the role of automation in 
identifying entities and individuals for individualized attention by 
enforcement entities.127 
B. Auto-Denies and Contractor Coordination 
Claims reimbursement relies on proper coding and matching of 
submitted claims to a complex database.128 Fraudulent entities can 
learn how to simulate a real practice and submit claims that look like 
those of an actual provider. But properly automated systems with 
some degree of artificial intelligence can, on the basis of past caught 
frauds, learn warning signs or triggers that cause “red flags” for 
investigators. Whereas the old model of enforcement was “pay and 
chase,” focused on external or after-the-fact indicia of problematic 
behavior,129 the hope under a regime of big data is that patterns of 
suspect behavior will provide a predicate for investigation.130 
We can think of the problems for law enforcement here as one 
subset of a larger inquiry involving the application of artificial 
intelligence methods to legal scenarios. As Julius Stone noted in The 
Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings, scholars have addressed the 
 
 126. Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1512 (2013). 
 127. See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 121–24 (2014) 
(relying on a “technological due process” model to address big data’s predictive privacy 
harms); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 41, 43 (2013) (calling for a “Technological Due Process” solution to 
governmental and corporate decision-making by big data predictions). 
 128. See ERIC D. GERST, VULTURE CULTURE 24–25 (2008) (discussing the various 
problems plaguing the insurance industry). See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, APPEAL THAT 
CLAIM (2011), available at https://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/psa/appeal-that-claim 
.pdf (providing a step-by-step process for implementing an improved claims auditing 
process). 
 129. Lisa A. Eramo, Stopping Fraud: Detecting and Preventing Fraud in the E-Health 
Era, J. AHIMA, Mar. 2011, at 28, 28, available at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups 
/public/documents/ahima/bok1_048698.hcsp?dDocName=bok1_048698 (“ ‘What we do 
now is pay and chase. You pay the bill and then do a pattern analysis to find outliers. Then 
you do a sting operation to recover maybe a million or billion dollars. . . . This is a drop in 
the bucket. We’re talking about a $250 billion problem.’ ” (quoting Donald W. Simborg, 
M.D., independent health IT consultant)). 
 130. See VICTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 27–28 
(2013); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 572 (1998) (“Technological standards [on the 
Internet] may be designed to prevent actions from taking place without the proper 
permissions or authority.”). 
CITE AS 92 N.C.L. REV. 1661 (2014) 
2014] PRIVATE CERTIFIERS AND DEPUTIES 1685 
 
automation of legal processes since at least the 1960s.131 It is difficult 
to successfully balance the imperatives of efficiency and basic legal 
values of regularity, fair play, and due process. Automation of 
contracts and even dispute resolution promises to add a great deal to 
productivity.132 On the other hand, we already have seen disastrous 
failures of automation, ranging from failures of record keeping during 
the housing crisis133 to the frightening “flash crash” in stock trading in 
2010.134 
Coordination problems between CMS and the various 
contractors fall somewhere in between these two conflicting results. 
New vistas of fraud detection have arisen, but notable failures are 
also clear. For example, the community mental health sector has 
come under well-justified scrutiny, but contractors have not cracked 
down with sufficient alacrity and celerity.135 For example, in one case 
a contractor determined that providers were billing for extensive 
partial hospitalization services.136 
How precise can these entities become? It is helpful to de-
familiarize the fraud context and think about the computability of 
legal determinations in general. The very idea of “computing” a legal 
obligation may seem strange at the outset, but law professor Harry 
Surden’s work on computability acclimates us to it by carefully 
explaining several concrete, real-world examples.137 Drawing from the 
world of finance, derivative contracts, and copyright licenses, he 
shows how humans can structure data in order to make it meaningful 
 
 131. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 37–41 (1964) 
(“[E]xperiments are proceeding in the use of electronic computers as aids to legal 
memory, analysis and thought.”). 
 132. See Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 689–90 
(2012). 
 133. See Danielle Douglas, New Rules Are Set to Curb Abuses by Mortgage Servicers, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2013, at A15.  
 134. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 13–14 (2010) 
(discussing factors that led to the “flash crash”). 
 135. For example, in Florida, some providers were serviced by a MAC/ZPIC and 
others were serviced by a FI/PSC. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 
86, at 20. 
 136. Id. at 21. Partial Hospitalization Program (“PHP”) services are “intense, 
structured outpatient mental health treatment programs,” which are “particularly 
vulnerable to fraud, waste and abuse.” Id. at 1–2. The MAC/ZPIC team serving the region 
identified the suspected providers and beneficiaries. Id. at 14. The MAC initiated an 
“auto-deny” to prevent future payments, but the fiscal intermediary for the region did not. 
Id. at 20–21. Thus the providers took another $520,000 after the MAC had tried to stop 
payments. Id. at 20. 
 137. See Surden, supra note 132, at 659–63. 
CITE AS 92 N.C.L. REV. 1661 (2014) 
1686 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92 
 
for computer software.138 For example, a DVD may be licensed for 
play only in the United States and Europe and then be “coded” so it 
can play only in those regions and not others.139 Were a human 
playing the DVD for the user, he might demand a copy of the DVD’s 
terms of use and receipt to see if it was authorized for playing in a 
given area. Computers need such a term translated into a language 
they can “understand”; or, to put it another way, the legal terms 
embedded in the DVD must lead to predictable reactions from the 
hardware that encounters them.140 
Surden explains the promise (and importance) of computable 
contracts in a world where machines are increasingly monitoring (and 
even creating) the real “states of the world” that trigger various 
contractual terms.141 Practitioners are creating shared meaning in 
computational systems by building up, step by step, a community’s 
understanding of the types of “givens” needed for such systems to 
work—including “captured legal assertions” that encode a human 
professional’s assessment of a given situation, such as: no podiatric 
claims for “clipped nails” should include over twenty clipped nails per 
patient per day. This is what is necessary for legal computation to 
function in positive and predictable ways. 
Such foundational concerns are relevant to ongoing challenges in 
the medical field’s adaptation of HIT. For example, one EHR system 
may be able to understand “C,” “cgh,” or “koff” as “cough,” and may 
well code it in any way it chooses. But to integrate and to port data, 
all systems need to be able to translate a symptom into a commonly 
recognized code. Health care providers can avoid getting “locked 
into” a system only if they can transport their records from one 
vendor to another. Patients want their providers to seamlessly 
integrate records. Assuring there is one universally useful record that 
can be processed by diverse parties is a critical aspect of health record 
adoption and improvement. This process of standardization and 
translation is also critical to an increasing number of legal scenarios. 
Well-defined syntax and semantics are an increasing concern for 
health and finance regulators. 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Peter K. Yu, Region Codes and the Territorial Mess, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 187, 194–95 (2012) (explaining the technology behind DVD region codes). 
 140. See Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 7–8 (2011) (noting that creating “accurate computer models of the substantive 
rules and factors implicated in legal decision-making” has been successful in certain 
contexts where legal rules are well established ex ante, such as tax law). 
 141. Id. at 4. 
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Unfortunately, digitization can also be a “force multiplier” when 
it comes to fraud.142 New technology can supercharge fraudulent 
billing practices.143 EHR systems include certain timesaving software 
tools, such as copy and paste functions, that increase the efficiency of 
health care delivery. However, these tools also can be used to commit 
fraud faster and with greater ease than ever before.144 This vexing 
issue may undermine the cost savings that have been promised 
regarding electronic health records.145 
C. Variation in Medicare Administrative Contractor Effectiveness 
The use of EHRs “makes it faster and easier [for providers] to be 
fraudulent,”146 but has not yet uniformly empowered fraud 
contractors to detect such fraud. Home health care agencies are 
another fraud-prone medical service where Medicare contractors 
have shown inconsistent efforts and correspondingly variable 
successes.147 Regional variations are pronounced.148 The MAC for 
Area A, which services significantly less home health agencies than 
the MAC for Area C,149 accounted for almost all of the prevented 
payments.150 ZPICs were also inconsistent in their investigation and 
 
 142. See FOUND. OF RESEARCH & EDUC., AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N, REPORT 
ON THE USE OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE AND EXPAND 
HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD ACTIVITIES 13 (2005) (“Without a deliberate effort to build 
fraud management into [electronic systems], healthcare payers and consumers will be 
exposed to new and potentially increased vulnerability to electronically-enabled 
healthcare fraud.”).  
 143. See Donald W. Simborg, There Is No Neutral Position on Fraud!, 18 J. AM. MED. 
INFORMATICS ASS’N 675, 676 (2011). 
 144. See generally Eramo, supra note 129, at 28–29 (discussing the need for better 
systems to detect and prevent false claims). 
 145. See Fred Schulte, Growth of Electronic Medical Records Eases Path to Inflated 
Bills, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 19, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.publicintegrity 
.org/2012/09/19/10812/growth-electronic-medical-records-eases-path-inflated-bill; Simborg, 
supra note 143, at 675. 
 146. See Reed Albeson, Julie Creswell & Griffin J. Palmer, Medicare Bills Rise as 
Records Turn Electronic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22 2012, at A1 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 147. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 113, at 2, 13–18 (reporting a study of 
contractor results in preventing fraud in home health care). 
 148. Id. at 13. 
 149. MAC A’s region included 326 home health agencies in 2011, while MAC C’s 
region had 6,812. Id. at 14. 
 150. Id. at 13. Both MACs appear to be using external and internal fraud investigation 
techniques, so it is unclear why MAC A had more success. It is possible that the difference 
in the number of home health agencies combined with the number of fraud-prone 
geographical areas overwhelmed MAC C, but MAC C did not cite this as a concern. 
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prevention of home health agency fraud.151 But pushback also comes 
from the other direction: from those who are concerned that ZPICs 
are demanding too much in their quest to reduce fraud. Their 
investigations have been called “the Wild West, because . . . there’s 
no real due process, there are no real checks and balances.”152 There 
appears to be no limit to the number of requests for additional 
documentation each ZPIC can require from providers, no notice of 
outcome requirement, and no opportunity to discuss a denial with a 
medical director.153 In an informal conversation with a practitioner in 
North Carolina, I learned that some of her clients are waiting over 
twenty-five months for “telephonic hearings” with administrative law 
judges.154 Both MACs and ZPICs can deny claims for what may be 
very subjective judgments, such as “illegible physician signatures or 
dates.”155 There also are inconsistent methods and approaches used 
by diverse contractors. Instead of trying to develop methods for 
unifying and simplifying the review process, CMS has opted to 
develop trainings for providers.156 
Admittedly, CMS faces a difficult task here. It is caught between 
advocates who will charge it with doing too little, and those who 
believe it is doing too much. The old standards for investigations need 
to be updated for the digital age. For example, consider the post-
payment reviews done by RAs.157 At first, CMS gave the RAs very 
strong incentives to find problematic practices, ordering that they 
could keep between nine and twelve and one-half percent of the 
funds they recovered, regardless of whether the claim was upheld on 
appeal.158 Unfortunately, many of the resulting investigations 
 
 151. Id. at 15. As with the investigations of community mental health centers discussed 
previously, the Zone 7 ZPIC had by far the most investigations of home health agencies, 
more than double the combined number of investigations of the other ZPICs in the study. 
Id. at 16. Zone 4 had the second highest number of investigations, but also covers almost 
double the number of providers as does Zone 7. Id. at 17. The delay resulted in continued 
payments, totaling over $650 million. Id. Based on these findings, CMS responded that it 
would modify the contractors’ statements of work to “clarify [the] processes” ZPICs use to 
screen high-risk providers. Id. at 21. 
 152. House Panel Considers CMS’ Medicare Fraud-Prevention Efforts, GOV’T 
CONTRACTOR, JUNE 27, 2012, at 1, 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 90, at 22. 
 154. Interview with North Carolina practitioner (Oct. 4, 2013). Due to the potential 
sensitivity of client relations, I am respecting the practitioner’s anonymity. 
 155. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 90, at 21–22. RAs can deny 
claims only based on reasonableness or lack of medical necessity. Id. at 22–24. 
 156. Id. at 32. 
 157. See generally id. at 19 (discussing post-payment reviews done by RAs). 
 158. Id.  
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ultimately failed to reveal any wrongdoing on appeal.159 CMS then 
changed course, ordering that RAs are not to be compensated if the 
determination of overpayment is reversed on appeal, as well as 
setting other limits on them.160 
Despite that concession, the American Hospital Association 
(“AHA”) is still not satisfied. It claims the audit process violates the 
Medicare Act.161 As a result of the audits, the AHA maintains, 
hospitals have lost hundreds of millions of dollars and face financial 
“uncertainty” that “ultimately may adversely affect patient care.”162 
The audit process can be very burdensome for some 
institutions.163 A recent case involving Gentiva Healthcare 
Corporation, which operated a home health care agency called 
Heritage Home Health, is instructive.164 Initially charged with 
overbilling by $4,242,452.10, Gentiva was actually responsible for just 
$850,000 in overpayments.165 That determination took six years from 
the date of the initial review166 and unknown expenditures of 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Memorandum from the Inspector Gen. to the Sec’y of DHHS, supra note 110. 
 161. Complaint at 1–2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-01770-CKK (D.D.C. 
filed Nov. 1, 2012), 2013 WL 2474428. The AHA charges that RAs are deeming medically 
necessary care improper if the care was provided in a hospital but could have been 
provided in an outpatient setting. Id. at 2–3. The AHA has argued that “when a hospital 
furnishes reasonable and medically necessary items and services, if payment cannot be 
made under Part A, it must be made under Part B,” but the latter payment may be 
delayed or not happen at all due to the complexity of the audit process. Id. at 4. 
 162. Id. The Secretary has moved for the case to be dismissed because, among other 
reasons, the plaintiffs are still pursuing administrative remedies and the Secretary has not 
issued a final rule. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Her Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a 
Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted at 3, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-
01770-CKK (D.D.C. June 6, 2013), 2013 WL 2474428. The Secretary, however, later 
amended the rule so that hospitals that had pending appeals could be compensated, but 
not those whose appeals had run, a remedy the AHA finds to be an “administrative shell 
game” that does not address the concerns of hospitals that have lost payments in the past. 
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 1–2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1770-CKK (D.D.C. June 27, 2013), 2013 WL 2474428 (citation 
omitted). 
 163. See Grigg, supra note 83. 
 164. See Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 2012), 
aff’d, 723 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 165. Id. at 4–5. The main issue in Gentiva was the contractor’s determination of a 
“sustained or high level of payment error,” which Gentiva argued could not be delegated 
to a contractor based on the statute. Id. at 2. The court disagreed and found that the 
delegation was within the Secretary’s authority and that Congress had expressly 
preempted judicial review of the determination. Id. 
 166. See id. at 2 (stating that the initial review took place in 2007). 
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resources.167 When the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and DHHS 
trumpet figures about how much new fraud deterrence measures have 
saved taxpayers, they must do a better job of accounting for the costs 
these measures visit on providers.168 Hard-pressed and stressed thanks 
to various cost-cutting pressures in the ACA, as well as larger 
economic trends, providers do not deserve to be burdened by 
protracted, expensive legal conflicts over genuine claims. 
CONCLUSION 
CMS uses private contractors extensively. In terms of its 
investigation and prevention of fraudulent billing activities, its 
contractors have shown inconsistent efficacy in performing their 
delegated duties. The post-payment auditing process in particular has 
become the subject of legal action as providers attempt to avoid 
substantial payment recoupments. In addition to the burden of legal 
action, the lack of CMS oversight has allowed private contractors to 
create conflicting and difficult requirements for providers. Because of 
these questionable activities and the uneven benefits, the use of 
private contractors for Medicare fraud prevention and investigation 
should be thoroughly scrutinized to assure that the time and money 
invested in enforcement is worth the amount recouped, discounted by 
the amount of unnecessary time, worry, and expense imposed on 
providers via the enforcement and audit process. 
For “front end” investigation of HIT, the ONC has enjoyed more 
success with ATCBs. The delegation process of authority to ATCBs 
is complex, and admittedly, these entities have begun as modes of 
qualifying providers for subsidies. However, lack of meaningful-use-
certified software will eventually lead to financial penalties, and we 
should not overstate the difference between subsidy and penalty in 
the marketplace even now—money is fungible and can be leveraged 
to provide critical advantages over competitors. 
 
 167. Cf. Christopher Young, Technical Component Laboratory Pathology Services: 
Who Bills? Know the Rules and Regulations and Make Sure You Have Systems in Place to 
Respond Quickly, 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 61 (2010) (describing a specific 
incident in which the RAC ultimately withdrew the audit but only after “both providers 
and the A/B Medicare administrative contractor (MAC) have had to expend resources 
responding to the audit and then repairing the damage”). 
 168. For example, the DOJ promoted a case in which HCA Inc. settled for $1.7 billion 
after being accused of improper billing and referral. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Largest Health Care Fraud Case in U.S. History Settled, HCA Investigation Nets 
Record Total of $1.7 Billion (June 26, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr 
/2003/June/03_civ_386.htm. The DOJ should have balanced this settlement recovery with 
the dollars lost to providers in their efforts to prepare for non-meritorious fraud claims. 
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The central theme of complaints against anti-fraud contractors is 
the post hoc nature of investigations. For providers, long waits for 
due process can disrupt revenue cycle management and sometimes 
even threaten the viability of their own enterprise. For fraud 
watchdogs, there are too many missed opportunities to stop egregious 
behavior.169 
I predict that, in the coming decade, there will be growing 
pressure to integrate features of fraud detection, public health 
surveillance, and comparative effectiveness research into HIT at the 
certification stage. Admittedly, such multidimensional programming 
may generate some slow and buggy “bloatware” ill-suited for high-
pressure, high-paced hospital environments. But if the pressures of 
responding to ZPICs, RACs, and other audit contractors become too 
high, providers themselves may try to preempt investigation by 
building in fraud-fighting tools at the front end. 
Many experts in the HIT field have been disappointed by 
information technology’s failure to “disrupt” health care—that is, to 
establish efficiencies and new modes of diagnosis and treatment that 
are radically cheaper (and make care far more accessible) than the 
presently dominant modes of care.170 For some, the hope is that 
massive information companies like Apple or Google will come in, a 
la deus ex machina, to transform the medical industry the way they 
have already impacted music and search. 
Unfortunately for this line of reasoning, Google has already tried 
(and failed) in this space with Google Health.171 Apple sells many 
health apps, but does not appear to be getting into the business of 
integrating data from them into extant electronic medical records or 
even personalized health records. Neither company appears 
interested in routine improvement of health outcomes, however much 
“singularitarianism” may appeal to Silicon Valley CEOs.172 
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Other historians and economists of innovation would instruct us 
to look to the government, rather than private industry, to take the 
lead here. Vernon Ruttan’s work has focused on the Defense 
Department’s critical role in funding innovations like interchangeable 
parts and Internet connectivity.173 The more one knows about the 
intertwining of state and market in health care, defense, 
telecommunications, energy, and banking, the less realistic any strict 
divide between “public” and “private” appears. Moreover, even the 
Internet sector, that last bastion of venture capital and risk taking, is 
more a creature of state intervention than market forces.174 
Whoever is “in the driver’s seat,” we can be assured that public-
private partnerships are a permanent feature of our health system’s 
landscape. The questions now are how to move beyond the problems 
emerging in key areas (like IT certification and fraud detection) and 
how to better calibrate responses to suboptimal medical practice. As 
cost pressures continue, the seamless integration of clinical decision 
support, revenue cycle management, and fraud detection will become 
a “holy grail” for both policymakers and actors in the private sector. 
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Research Projects Agency bankrolled the Internet, and the CIA and the military 
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